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ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
DAVID J. PADILLA***
I. INTRODUCTION - THE SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS
The Organization of American States (OAS) is a regional in-
ternational organization. It was created with the deposit of the
tenth instrument of ratification of its Charter by Colombia on De-
cember 13, 1951. Its purpose was to achieve peace and justice, to
promote solidarity among its members, to strengthen their cooper-
ation, and to defend their respective sovereignties, territories and
independence.'
Historically, the OAS is the direct descendant of the Interna-
tional Union of American Republics which was formed in Washing-
ton, D.C. in 1890 to collect and distribute information relating to
commercial matters of common interest to the Western Hemi-
sphere nations. Accordingly, it is the world's oldest organization of
its kind. The Pan American Union (PAU) became known as the
General Secretariat (Secretariat) of the OAS with the amendment
of the Charter of BogotA by the Protocol of Buenos Aires in 1967.1
While the OAS has a General Assembly, councils, committees,
and various specialized conferences and organizations in keeping
with its modern and broadened role, its central and permanent or-
gan is the Secretariat.4 The OAS is now more than simply a mutual
* A.B., J.D., University of Detroit; M.A., University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., George
Washington University; Former Deputy General Counsel, OAS; presently Assistant
Executive Secretary, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
** This study is based on research done for the LL.M. thesis at the George Washington
University. The author is grateful for the National Law Center's permission to adopt the
thesis for the purpose of this article. In addition, the author wishes to thank the General
Secretariat of the OAS for permission to publish this work. The opinions contained in the
article are the author's own and do not necessarily represent the views of the General
Sectrtatiat.
1. Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948 [hereinafter cited as
OAS CHARTER]. The OAS CHARR was signed at the Ninth International Conference of
American States held at BogotA, Colombia, OEA/SER.A/7/Rev. 2 (Original: Spanish).
2. Id., pt. I, ch. I, arts. 1, 2.
3. Protocol of Buenos Aires, signed at the Third Special Inter-American Conference,
Feb. 15-27, 1967, OEA/SER. X/4/Rev. 1.
4. OAS CHARTER, supra note 1, at ch. XIX, art. 113.
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defense alliance.
A Secretary General who directs the Secretariat, is elected
every five years by the General Assembly. The Secretariat, head-
quartered in Washington, D.C., consists of approximately 1500 ca-
reer servants. These career servants form a multinational group of
professional, technical, and clerical staff drawn from the various
OAS member states. Under the direction of the Secretary General,
this staff is charged with implementing the programs and decisions
of the General Assembly and its subordinate policy-making or-
gans.5 Although most of the staff works at the Washington head-
quarters, over two hundred employees live work in the different
member states.
International organizations have been created by multilateral
conventions whose member governments cooperate to achieve com-
mon ends. Since World War II, there has been a great proliferation
of such organizations as the nations of the world confront increas-
ingly complex and specialized problems which defy domestic
solutions.
In this century, international organizations have realized that
in order to yield desired results, they must enjoy a high degree of
independence from any single member state or group of member
states. To that end, the constitutive treaties of international orga-
nizations invariably address the question of privileges and immuni-
ties of the organization and its agents.' As a result, international
organizations have achieved juridical personalities similar to that
of private corporations.7 Unlike corporations, however, interna-
tional organizations, with certain exceptions, are not subject to the
national law of any one state or group of states.'
The Charter of the OAS, as amended by the Protocol of Bue-
nos Aires, is the constitutive instrument in which its American
framers sought to embody the organization's values. The functions
5. Id. at arts. 117, 118.
6. E.g., U.N. CHARTR art. 105, 16 U.S.T. 1134; OAS CHARTER, supra note 1, at ch.
XXIII, arts. 139-41.
7. U.N. CHAR art. 104; OAS CiARTER, supra note 1, at ch. XXII, art. 139.
8. U.N. Agreement on Principles and Immunities, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 16-33, 90 U.N.T.S.
329 (errata). To further insulate international organizations and their servants from undue
influence, and to enhance the prospects for their success, a unique international legal regime
has come into existence. It regulates the organizations' activities, defines their powers, and
ensures, insofar as possible, their effectiveness. This legal regime is the most effective way to
benefit the community of nations encompassed by the organization, while giving the organi-
zation sufficient autonomy to best guarantee its international character.
[Vol. 14:2
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
of each OAS organ are defined in general terms in the Charter.
The specific rules and procedures of the various organs are in-
cluded in hierarchically inferior instruments designed to spell out
the intent of the Charter's authors.
The Secretariat's instrument is known as the "General Stan-
dards to Govern the Operations of the General Secretariat of the
Organization of American States" (General Standards).' Article 15
of the General Standards illustrates the desire of the member
states to allow the Secretariat autonomy in its operations:
In the performance of their duties, the Secretary General and
the Assistant Secretary General shall not seek or receive instruc-
tions from any government or any authority outside the Organi-
zation and shall refrain from any action that may be incompati-
ble with their position as international officers responsible only
to the Organization.'0
In order to maintain the autonomy of the OAS, international
career servants are prohibited from accepting employment with
any government or nomination to public office, or from seeking the
political influence or support from any government.' They are
free, however, to exercise their political rights to vote and support
the party or candidates of their choice in their respective coun-
tries."2 In order to establish concrete personnel policies for the
Secretariat, the Secretary General has published a set of Staff
Rules."3 These rules set forth legally binding rights and duties
9. General Standards to Govern the Operations of the General Secretariat of the OAS
Approved by the General Assembly by AG/RES 123 (111-0/73) and amended through AG/
RES. 248, 249, 256 and 257 (VI-o/76) and AG/RES 301 (VII-o/77), OEA/SER.D/I.1.2/Rev.2
(1977). (Original: Spanish) [hereinafter cited as General Standards].
The General Standards were proposed by the Permanent Council in accordance with
Charter Article 91b, and were adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS on April 14,
1973. Charter Article 91b provides that the General Assembly shall:
watch over the observance of the standards governing the operation of the Gen-
eral Secretariat and, when the General Assembly is not in session, adopt provi-
sions of a regulatory nature that enable the General Secretariat to carry out its
administrative functions.
OAS CHARTER, supra note 1, at ch. XIV, art. 91.
10. General Standards, supra note 9, at art. 15.
The same point is made in articles 18, 21, and 25 regarding the international career
servants. Id. at arts. 18, 21, 25. In addition, the Secretary General and his staff are expected
to refrain from any conduct which might be detrimental to a particular member state. Id. at
art. 23.
11. Id. at arts. 26, 29. See also Organization of American States Staff Rules 101, OEA/
SER.D11.6/Rev.1 (Original: Spanish) [hereinafter cited as OAS Staff Rules].
12. Id.
13. Id. The OAS Staff Rules were created as a result of the Secretary General's publica-
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which govern the professional activities, and in some measure, the
private lives of the Secretariat's staff. The interpretation and ap-
plication of the OAS Charter, the General Standards, and the Staff
Rules will form, to a great extent, the subject of this study.
In spite of the OAS' need for autonomy from national govern-
ments it has not gone unchallenged, particularly as it pertains to
the international civil servant. To some degree a natural tension
exists between the principle of autonomy of international organiza-
tions and the inherent tendency on the part of nation-states to
place their self-interests above the organization's philosophy. Ad-
ditionally, it is not surprising that individual staff members have
at times sought to test the limits of these principles. Moreover,
within the Organization and its constituent bodies, relationships
which create frictions constantly evolve. This is not necessarily a
weakness of the Organization, but rathr an inevitable and, for the
most part, a positive reflection of the dynamic character of human
beings and their institutions. The following discussion will focus
generally upon the administrative labor law of international orga-
nizations, and particularly upon the Administrative Tribunal of
the OAS.14
II. ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
A. Introduction
The international career servant is a key participant in inter-
national organizations. Theoretically, his motivation goes beyond
parochial nationalism and aims for the common welfare of the na-
tions whose governments created the international organization.1"
tion of Executive Order No. 74-3 of December 20, 1974. The latest version of the Staff Rules
dates from January 1, 1975.
14. The author intends to present this study in a scientific and theoretical manner for
the sake of both clarity and intelligent analysis. The value of this investigation depends
upon a consistent examination of the subject within a broad framework. For this purpose,
the methodology of two important theorists in this field, Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S.
McDougal, has been employed. In these theorists' perception of the World Public Order
System, participants who interact dynamically in a given political, social, and economic
arena are motivated by particular values. This is known as the Community Value Process.
For a conceptualization of value analysis, see M. McDour.AL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, ch. 1 (1960) [hereinafter cited as McDoUGAL & ASSOCIATES]; H. LASS-
WELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER & SOCIETY, ch. IV (1950). See also McDougal, Some Basic Theo-
retical Concepts About International Law, A Policy Oriented Framework of Inquiry, 4 J.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 346 (1960).
15. As commented upon by Jencks, Due Process of International Organizations, 19
INT'L ORG. 2 (1965).
262 [Vol. 14:2
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The international career servant is in a peculiar position since he
often must leave his native country, uproot his family, temporarily
sever his business, professional, and cultural connections, and cast
his lot with an untried institution.
Because the international career servant owes allegiance to his
particular international organization, he is deliberately insulated
from external pressures."6 This necessary and desirable insulation,
however, brings with it certain consequences, the most important
of which is security.
Since the treatment and conduct of the international em-
ployee are not generally subject to the law of any given state, the
international staff member is rendered quite vulnerable. He can-
not, like his national counterpart, readily appeal to public opinion
for support. Nor does he have access to his congress or parliament.
The staff associations of international organizations generally have
little legal power to redress administrative actions which affect in-
ternational career servants either individually or collectively. Addi-
tionally, the difficulties commonly encountered by experienced in-
ternational employees in finding new employment enhance their
vulnerability. 17 Virtually all international organizations provide for
some type of internal grievance and disciplinary procedure which a
staff member may use to obtain redress in case of arbitrary
treatment."6
B. Remedies-OAS
In the General Secretariat of the OAS redress takes two forms.
First, a staff member may request a hearing by the Secretary Gen-
eral when an administrative measure affecting the employee's in-
terests is involved.19 This request stays the administrative measure
in question until the Secretary General has duly responded within
the period prescribed in the Staff Rules.20
The hearing, known as an Audiencia, is somewhat misleading.
It generally consists of a simple interchange of written communica-
16. General Standards, supra note 9, at art. 28; OAS Staff Rules, supra note 11, at
101.7.
17. M.B. AKEHURST, THE LAW GOVERNING EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS, ch. 1 (1967).
18. General Standards, supra note 9, at arts. 50, 57-63; OAS Staff Rules, supra note 11,
at 111-12.
19. Id. OAS Staff Rules at 112.1.
20. Id.
1982]
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tions between the staff member and the Secretary General. In
practice, however, the Secretary General almost always ratifies the
Administration's decision since this step in the grievance proce-
dure does not include fact-finding. Moreover, it must be accom-
plished within a relatively short period of time.2 The utility of this
procedural step is somewhat questionable given these practical
limitations.
Second, assuming that the Secretary General renders a re-
sponse contrary to the staff member's interests at Audiencia, the
career servant then may request that a Joint Advisory Committee
on Reconsideration (JACR) be convoked to examine the claim
more closely.22 This is known as Reconsideration. The employee
must make this request within 15 days of notification of the Secre-
tary General's response at Audiencia.s
The JACR has broad investigative powers. Its responsibilities
which require it to hear the claimant, who may either represent
himself or designate another staff member for this purpose.2 4 In
addition, the Secretary General may be represented by any staff
member the Secretary shall so designate2 5 The Department of Le-
gal Affairs of the Secretariat usually performs this function.
While the procedure is normally limited to written statements
and oral comments thereon by the parties, the JACR may also ob-
tain from any staff members the evidence that it deems appropri-
ate for its investigation.2 This quasi-subpoena power also extends
to relevant documentary material kept in the Secretariat. The ini-
tiation of the Reconsideration process, unlike the Audiencia, does
not suspend the implementation of the decision under challenge. 7
21. Id. at 112.1(a), (b), (c).
22. Id. at 112.2.
23. The JACR is composed of three persons representing, respectively, the Secretary
General, the Staff Committee, and a chairman selected in each case by agreement of the two
other members. OAS Staff Rules, supro note 11, at 112.4.
24. Id. at 112.5(c).
25. Id. at 112.5(c), para. 2.
26. Id. at 112.5(0.
27. Id. at 112.5(d).
The Staff Rules also provide for disqualification of committee members, id. at 112.4(b),
(d), (e); conciliatory functions, id. at 112.5(g); and majority rule with the right to present a
written dissent, id. at 112.5(h).
Except in cases involving the unsatisfactory performance of services, the JACR may
review both the substantive and procedural aspects of an administrative measure. However,
where work performance is at issue, the Administration's performance evaluation of an em-
ployee may only be examined insofar as the facts may show that the decision was motivated
by prejudice or some other irrelevant factor. Id. at 112.3(b).
[Vol. 14:2
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In cases of alleged infractions of Secretariat rules by staff
members, a special review body, called the Joint Disciplinary Com-
mittee, is provided for in the Staff Rules.2 8 This Committee is sim-
ilar to the JACR in that it too has an essentially advisory
function.2 '
It differs, however, in that it is convoked by the Secretary
General before imposing disciplinary measures that are more se-
vere than an oral admonition."0 Moreover, the harsher measures
such as written admonition, written censure, suspension, and dis-
missal, may not be imposed before the Joint Disciplinary Commit-
tee has made recommendations based upon its findings.2
This principle is subject to the single important exception
that, in cases of summary dismissal warranted by clear evidence of
serious misconduct, immediate enforcement may be imposed.
32
Even here, however, a summary hearing is required and the deci-
sion may be appealed to the JACR. However, the appeal does not
bar application of the summary dismissal order.3
The internal legal mechanisms used in the General Secretariat
typify internal procedures employed by international organizations
both to air members' grievances and to enforce disciplinary mea-
sures. Due process safeguards compensate for the peculiar vulnera-
bility of the international career servant. Exhaustion of internal
remedies is generally a sine qua non for appeal to international
administrative tribunals. Except where parties to a labor dispute
waive their exhaustion of internal remedies by written mutual con-
sent, the failure to exhaust internal remedies will bar appeal to the
administrative tribunals.8 4
28. Id. at 111.2.
29. Id. at 111.2(a).
30. Id. at 111.3(a).
31. Id. at 111.1(c), (d).
32. Id. at 110.5, 111.1(d). Examples of causes for summary dismissal include but are not
limited to: abandonment of post, deliberate false statements of a serious nature related to
his employment, or a repetition of the commission or omission of acts that have already
given rise to disciplinary measures.
33. Id. at 111.1(d), (i).
Any adverse decision made by the Secretary General in a disciplinary action, after re-
ceiving advice from the Disciplinary Committee, may be appealed to the JACR as of right.
Id. at 112.2. Thus, in disciplinary cases, there is a second level of internal review that is
available. Each committee may conduct what is effectively a de novo administrative trial of
law and fact. Id. at 112.
34. See, e.g., Statute of U.N. Administrative Tribunal, art. 7 (1949); 3 Y.B. U.N. 922
(1948-49). See also Statute of the ILO Administrative Tribunal, art. VII (October 9, 1946)
(hereinafter cited as ILOAT], reprinted in A.H. SCHECHTER, INTERPRETATION OF AMBIGUOUS
19821
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C. Administrative Tribunals of International Organizations
The internal legal structures of international organizations
commonly provide for in-house processes like those described
above. Not all international organizations though, have gone so far
as to establish an independent professional judicial body, generally
called an administrative tribunal. A substantial number have, how-
ever, created their own tribunals or else have adhered to the stat-
utes of other such tribunals, thereby subjecting themselves to the
jurisdiction of these specialized labor courts.5
1. The League of Nations' Administrative Tribunal
The first modern international secretariat was that of the In-
ternational Institute of Agriculture, founded in 1905.36 The crea-
tion of its permanent staff served as the model for the Secretariat
of the League of Nations and those of other international
organizations.
The maintenance of a full-time multinational secretariat as-
signed to various duty stations throughout the world necessitated
equal treatment of staff members in terms of rules of conduct, re-
muneration, and benefits. Thus, there was a need both for inde-
pendence from the differing municipal laws of the various coun-
tries, and for a consistent and fair internal legal structure to
govern the rights and duties of international career servants.
Although founded in 1920, the League of Nations did not cre-
ate its prototypical Administrative Tribunal until 1927."
The League Charter provided for a career servant's right of
direct appeal to the League Council. However, this procedure had
proven both cumbersome and unsuccessful because the League
Council was eminently political and, thus, not suited to judicial
DOCUMENTS BY INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS (1964).
35. There are several exceptions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the Interna-
tional Satellite Organization, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
36. The International Institute of Agriculture (IIA) was the forerunner of the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations' family of specialized agencies. AKEiuRsT,
supra note 17, at 4.
37. The creation of the League's tribunal was a consequence of a controversy known as
the Monod case. In that instance, an ad hoc Commission of Jurists was selected by the
League Council to examine Monod's claim. AKEHURST, supra note 17, at 13. See also Com-
ment, Administrative Tribunals as Adjudicators of Disputes Arising Out of Employment
Contracts With International Organizations, 54 MICH. L. REv. 533, 535 (1956).
[Vol. 14:2
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functions.3 8 Furthermore, it was quickly apparent from the Monod
case that dealing with labor disputes on an ad hoc basis did not
provide a lasting solution to the problem, because it was unclear
when such committees should be convoked and what their author-
ity would be vis a vis the League's other organs.
Therefore, in 1929, the League Council formed a small, spe-
cialized labor court on an experimental basis. This court, the Ad-
ministrative Tribunal, was to hear labor cases arising in the Secre-
tariat, and also disputes concerning the Secretariat's pension
program.3 9 In addition, the Administrative Tribunal's jurisdiction
was extended to similar controversies in the International Labour
Office, the forerunner of the International Labour Organization."
In 1931, the League Assembly voted to afford this small, efficient
body permanent status in the League's legal system."1 When the
League of Nations was officially abolished in 1946, the newly con-
stituted International Labour Organization (ILO), a specialized
agency of the United Nations, inherited the AdminiStrative Tribu-
nal of the League of Nations.
In eighteen years, the League's Administrative Tribunal has
decided thirty-seven cases. One commentator stated that the
Tribunal
made a significant contribution to the development both of the
international career service and of international administrative
tribunals. It was the first, and on the whole, successful experi-
ment in legal protection of the rights of the international civil
servant. As such it was to serve as a model for future interna-
tional administrative tribunals."2
2. The Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations
After World War II, various national planners of the United
Nations (UN) urged the creation of an administrative tribunal sim-
ilar to that of the League to adjudicate labor disputes arising in
the Secretariat. However, some UN members who either because
they were unfamiliar with such an international judicial body, or
38. Covenant of the League of Nations, reprinted in F.O. WILCOX, THE RATIpICATION OP
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 125 (1935).
39. Statute of the League of Nations' Administrative Tribunal (September 26, 1927),
reprinted in I M.O. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION (1931).
40. AKEHURST, supra note 17, at 13.
41. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., Spec. Supp. 93, 152 (1931).
42. B.C. KOH, THE UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL 30-31 (1966).
19821
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because they favored a strong and unfettered Secretary General,
postponed the creation of the UN's Administrative Tribunal until
1949. Interestingly, both the United States and the Soviet Union
were among those countries initially opposed to the Tribunal's cre-
ation.4" Today, the UN Tribunal's jurisdiction covers both staff
members of the UN General Secretariat and the staff members of
other specialized international organizations in the UN system.",
This jurisdiction extends also to disputes including the pension
plans of the different organizations."
Amid the anti-communist hysteria of the early 1950's, the
UN's Administrative Tribunal was severely tested by United
States' allegations that the Secretariat harbored US citizens and
others engaged in subversive activities. The General Assembly
challenged the binding nature of the Tribunal's decisions when the
Tribunal firmly defended its staff members' rights. Taking advan-
tage of a provision in the Tribunal's Statute,4 6 the General Assem-
bly submitted the following questions to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion regarding the Tribunal's
power:
(1) [H]as the General Assembly the right on any grounds to re-
fuse to give effect to an award of compensation made by that
Tribunal in favour of a staff member of the United Nations
whose contract of service has been terminated without his
assent?
(2) If the answer given by the Court to question (1) is in the
affirmative, what are the principal grounds upon which the Gen-
eral Assembly could lawfully exercise such a right? 7
The World Court, by a 9 to 3 vote, answered the first question
in the negative.'" The Court's opinion reads in pertinent part:
According to a well-established and generally recognized princi-
ple of law, a judgment rendered by such a judicial body is res
judicata and has binding force between the parties ....
43. In the meantime, however, the World Health Organization (WHO), a member of
the UN family, adhered to the ILO Tribunal's Statute. AKEHURST, supra note 17, at 14-15.
44. The UN Tribunal currently has jurisdiction over the UN (including UNRWA and
UNICEF), and the pension funds of ICAO, IMCO, FAO, IDAEA, ILO, UNESCO, WHO and
WMO.
45. See, e.g., Statute of U.N. Administrative Tribunal, supra note 34, at art. 2.
46. Id. at art. 11.
47. 13 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 870 (1953).
48. Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47 (Advisory Opinion dated July 13, 1954).
268 [Vol. 14:2
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Such a contract of service is concluded between the staff
member concerned and the Secretary-General in his capacity as
the chief administrative officer of the United Nations Organiza-
tion. . . . When the Secretary-General concludes such a con-
tract. . . he engages the legal responsibility of the Organization
. . . . If he terminates the contract of service without the assent
of the staff member and this action . . . is referred to the Ad-
ministrative Tribunal, the parties. . will become bound by the
judgment of the Tribunal. This judgment is, according to Article
10 of the Tribunal's Statute, final and without appeal. [Tihe
• . . Organization becomes legally bound to carry out the judg-
ment and to pay the compensation awarded to the staff member.
It follows that the General Assembly, as an organ of the United
Nations, must likewise be bound by the judgment."'
While only an advisory opinion, the ICJ's holding went un-
challenged. However, the Assembly subsequently amended the UN
Tribunal's Statute to allow for ICJ review in given cases and to
permit the Assembly to request that the Tribunal itself review its
own decision. Nevertheless, the judicial nature and authority of the
UN's Tribunal, and to some extent that of its sister tribunals, was
upheld.
This World Court opinion reversed a decision made during the
last days of the League of Nations. That instance involved a num-
ber of terminated staff members who alleged breach of their em-
ployement contracts. The League Tribunal held that the League
Assembly could not unilaterally and retroactively violate the ac-
quired contractual rights of the League Secretariat's employees.
Thus, the League Tribunal, by authority of its Statute, awarded
money damages to the plaintiffs. Since the termination of these
staff members had occurred in accordance with a Resolution of the
League Assembly, publication of the Tribunal's opinion precipi-
tated a crisis."' The question then arose whether the supreme po-
litical-legislative organ which had created the Tribunal was there-
after bound to execute the court's decisions. Unlike the UN
Tribunal cases, however, a League Assembly subcommittee found
that the Tribunal's decisions were not obligatory. The Assembly,
by a 16 to 9 vote with 4 abstentions, accepted the subcommittee's
findings, thus rejecting the notion of the binding nature of the
49. Id. at 47, 53, 62.
50. Mayras v. Secretary General of the League of Nations, 13 ANN. DIG. 247 (Admin.
Trib. of the League of Nations 1946).
19821
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League Tribunal's decisions."
3. The ILO Tribunal
As successor to the League Tribunal, the Administrative Tri-
bunal of the ILO, headquartered in Geneva, presently hears cases
brought by ILO international career servants and the career ser-
vants of other international organizations which adhere to the
ILO's Statute."2
Although the UN Tribunal's Statute has been amended to
provide that the Secretary General, a member state, or an inter-
ested party in a controversy before the Tribunal may appeal to the
ICJ for advisory opinions, a staff member is denied this right.
However, Article XII of the ILO Tribunal's Statute states that if
an international organization, subject to the Tribunal's Statute,
deems a Tribunal decision to be procedurally flawed in a funda-
mental way, the organization's governing body may request an ICJ
"advisory opinion" which shall bind the parties."3
In 1956, the Executive Board of UNESCO used Article XII to
question the ILO Tribunal's competence. The World Court held
that the Tribunal was competent to hear UNESCO cases and that
the Tribunal's judgments in those matters were valid. Further-
more, the Court stated that the fact that "'the Tribunal may have
rightly or wrongly interpreted and applied the law for the purposes
of determining the merits in no way affects its jurisdiction.'-54
This ICJ opinion, further bolstered the authority of the UN's and
ILO's Administrative Tribunals, and by analogy that of the other
administrative tribunals.
4. The OECD Appeals Board
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) is the successor to the Organization for European Eco-
nomic Cooperation (OEEC), which established an Appeals Board
in 1950.*5 The Appeals Board is a true administrative tribunal and
51. AKEHURST, supra note 17, at 16.
52. The ILO Tribunal currently has jurisdiction over the ILO, WHO, UNESCO, ITU,
WMO, FAO, CERN, ICITO - GATT,. IAEA, BIRPI, and UPU.
53. ILOAT Statute, supra note 34, at art. XII.
54. KOH, supra note 42, at 31 n.27, citing YOUNG, IMERNATIONAL CivnM SERVICE 193
(1958).
55. AKEHURST, supra note 17, at 15.
[Vol. 14:2
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like those of the UN and the ILO, its decisions are legally binding.
Its functions are not advisory or conciliatory as in the case of the
UN's internal Joint Appeals Board. 6 Unlike the UN, ILO, and
OAS Tribunals, however, the oral proceedings of the Appeals
Board are not public, although its opinions are available upon
request.51
5. The European Court of Justice
The European Communities are united under three basic trea-
ties: the Treaties of Rome which created the European Economic
Community (EEC) or the "European Common Market" and the
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Community Treaty (ECSC) signed in Paris
on April 18, 1951." This treaty created the European Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ).0 '
Both the EEC and the EURATOM Treaties expressly provide
that the Court, inter alia, "shall have jurisdiction in any dispute
between the Community and its servants within its limits and
under the conditions laid down in the staff Regulations or the Con-
ditions of Employment.""0 In the case of the ECSC, the Court's
jurisdiction is based on that institution's Staff Regulations, Article
91 which provided that
all disputes between one of the Communities and one of the per-
sons mentioned in the present Regulations, which concern the
legality of an act affecting that person's legal position shall be
submitted to the Court of Justice of the European
Communities."1
The ECJ acts as an administrative tribunal in matters involv-
ing the interpretation of the legal rights and duties of international
career servants employed by the various European Communities.
The ECJ has much broader competence than the tribunals previ-
56. The Joint Appeals Board is similar to the OAS's Reconsideration Committee. U.N.
Staff Rules, ST/SGB/Staff Rules/Rev. 3, ch. XI, no. 111 (1976).
57. KOH, supra note 42, at 33. The United States belongs to the OECD.
58. Office of Official Publications of the EEC, Luxembourg, 1973; see also E. STEIN,
DOCUMENTS FOR EUROPEAN COMMUNrY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 40, 1, and 206
respectively (1976) (hereinafter cited as STRIN).
59. The ECJ's powers were further defined in the Protocol to the EEC Treaty, called
the Statute of the Court of Justice, STEIN, supra note 58, at 86.
60. See STEIN, supra note 58, at EEC Treaty, at art. 179, EURATOM Treaty, at art.
152.
61. European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Staff Regulations, at art. 91(b).
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ously discussed in terms of both the interpretation and applicabil-
ity of national laws in light of the Community Treaties, and its role
as adjudicator of legal disputes between member states and the
Communities' various institutions.
This extremely broad, and unique competence has resulted in
the suggestion that the Court's function as an administrative tribu-
nal should be limited, or even assigned to another judicial body
since the Court must consider matters which are both much
broader in scope and of greater consequence to the citizens of the
member states. However, the ECJ continues to decide internal la-
bor disputes arising in the Communities just as the other currently
active administrative tribunals hear claims arising in their respec-
tive international organizations. 2
A unique feature of this sui generis institution is that private
individuals may appeal to the Court in an action against one of the
Communities, its institutions, or its agents. Thus, unlike other ad-
ministrative tribunals in which the international civil servant is in-
variably the plaintiff, and his employer or the administrator of his
pension fund is the defendant, an international civil servant before
the ECJ may be a defendant on appeal in an action brought
against him. This occurs in the context of a national court where
the international servant's functional privileges and immunities ei-
ther do not cover him, or have been waived.6s3
Undoubtedly, the institutionalization of administrative tribu-
nals has to some extent limited the discretionary authority gener-
ally vested in the respective administrations of international secre-
tariats. These courts insulate the international servant from
national pressures, and afford him protection against arbitrary ad-
ministrative action. However, in so doing, these tribunals limited
their own powers. In addition, both the executive and parliamen-
tary branches of international organizations often have had to ap-
propriate funds to meet the awards ordered by the various
tribunals.
The UN organizations have over 12,000 staff members. The
European Communities employ approximately 5,000 persons, and
the OAS General Secretariat has over 1,500 employees. The crucial
62. It is interesting to note that the ECJ, unlike its counterparts in other international
organizations, is permanent in nature and requires that its seven members be lawyers.
63. See STEIN, supra note 58. ECSC Treaty, at arts. 40, 42, EEC Treaty, at arts. 178-99,
181, 215, EURATOM Treaty, at arts. 151-53, 188.
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functions of these organizations, and the generally high-technical
quality of their respective multinational staffs affords a deeper un-
derstanding of the scope and importance of international courts, in
spite of the fact that the numbers of employees may not appear to
be very large."
The collective jurisprudence of the various administrative
tribunals, although reflective of the disparate characters and idio-
syncrasies of the different international organizations, nevertheless
produces some interesting cross-pollination. Common concepts
such as acquired rights, procedural due process, and exhaustion of
internal remedies are embraced by the various courts. The
problems which most frequently give rise to litigation are also
quite similar. Complaints stem mainly from employment termina-
tions, lack of promotions, and improper job classifications. The
general debt owed by the OAS Tribunal to other tribunals shall
become quite apparent in the ensuing discussion of the principles
developed by the OAS Court.
III. SOURCES OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
A. Introduction
Part One of this study outlined the relationship among the
Charter of the OAS, the General Standards, and Staff Rules. These
types of laws are what Hans W. Baade and others in the field call
the "internal law" of international organizations."' However, this is
not the sole source of law for these institutions. The following is a
breakdown of the various sources of law applied by international
organizations utilizing the UN and OAS as specific examples.
B. Internal Law
1. UN Staff Regulations and Rules; OAS General Standards
and Staff Rules
The UN Secretary General's Staff Rules supplement the Gen-
64. Not all international organizations have administrative tribunals. The most con-
spicious instances of institutions lacking such legal machinery are the World Bank, the IMF,
the IDB, and Intelsat. In administrative and disciplinary cases, however, these institutions
provide for some type of hearing similar to the OAS Reconsideration process. Furthermore,
some United States-based organizations are considering either creating their own tribunals,
or adhering to the statute of an already existing tribunal.
65. Baade, The Acquired Rights of International Public Servants, 15 Am. J. Comp. L.
253 (1967).
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eral Assembly's Staff Regulations. These Rules augment the Regu-
lations and specify how they are to be implemented. The OAS
General Standards are the equivalent of the UN Staff Regulations.
As in the UN, the OAS Secretary General promulgates the Staff
Rules.
2. Personnel and Management Circulars, Administrative
Memoranda, and Executive Orders
UN public service law parallels that of the OAS General Sec-
retariat. However, the OAS uses a somewhat more cumbersome
system of personnel circulars, administrative memoranda, execu-
tive orders, and management circulars to explain and detail its
General Standards and Staff Rules. These papers constitute the
administrative policy of the Secretariat and, thus are binding on
both management and staff. However, these periodic instructions
are hierarchically inferior to the Staff Rules, the General Stan-
dards, and the Charter, and as such, may not conflict with those
superior sources of internal law.06
Each international organization has its own comparable inter-
nal statutory law. The text of the "Scope and Purpose" of the
UN's Staff Regulations indicates the importance of organizations'
Staff Rules:
The Staff Regulations embody the fundamental conditions
of service and the basic rights, duties and obligations of the
United Nations Secretariat. They represent the broad principles
of personnel policy for the staffing and administration of the
Secretariat. The Secretary General, as the Chief Administrative
Officer, shall provide and enforce such staff rules consistent with
these principles as he considers necessary."7
This statement also describes the relationship between the General
Standards and Staff Rules of the OAS. The staff rules of both the
UN and OAS Secretariats are amendable by their respective Secre-
66. The circulars, memoranda, and orders emanate from different authorities within the
Secretariat. The Personnel Circulars are issued by the Director of Personnel, and the Man-
agement Circulars are issued by the Assistant Secretary for Management. Each of these two
parties derives his authority from, and acts in the name of the Secretary General. The Sec-
retary General issues the Executive Orders and Administrative Memoranda.
These various employer-employee communications do not all necessarily relate to per-
sonnel policy; they may also deal with a departmental reorganization, or with any other
administrative matter.
67. United Nations Staff Regulations and Staff Rules, ST/SGB/Staff Rules/l/Rev.3, at
1 [hereinafter cited as UN Staff Rules].
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taries General as long as the amendments are consistent with the
Staff Regulations (UN) and the General Standards (OAS).08
3. Exceptions
The respective Secretaries General may make exceptions to
the Staff Rules, "provided that such exception is not inconsistent
with any staff regulation or other decision of the General Assembly
and provided further that it is agreed to by the staff member di-
rectly affected and is, in the opinion of the Secretary General, not
prejudicial to the interests of any other staff member or groups of
staff members." ' The General Standards/Staff Regulations and
Staff Rules of these two organizations are more than legal instru-
ments. They are also declarations of moral ideals and standards.7
0
The Regulations, General Standards, and Staff Rules give detailed
explanations of the procedures to be followed by employers and
employees in implementing these instruments.
4. Other "Rules"
Each organization also has its own additional written sources
of law which affect the rights and duties of international career
servants. For example, the OAS has the Budgetary and Financial
Rules of the General Secretariat.7 1 While its essential purpose is to
fix a standard for financial and budgetary practices, investments,
auditing practices and the like, it also defines the fiduciary respon-
sibility of certain Secretariat officers.
68. Id. at 112.2(a); OAS Staff Rules, supra note 11, at 113.4.
69. Exec. Order 75-9 amending OAS Staff Rules, supra note 11, at 113; UN Staff Rules,
supra note 67, at 112.4(b).
70. An example of the moral ideals incorporated into these various rules is seen in UN
Staff Regulation 1.1:
Members of the Secretariat are international civil servants. Their responsibilities
are not national but exclusively international. By accepting appointments, they
pledge themselves to discharge their functions and to regulate their conduct with
the interests of the United Nations only in view.
Supra note 67, at 1.1. Similar language can be found in the OAS General Standards, and in
the Staff Rules of the two secretaries. OAS General Standards, supra note 9, at Article 18;
UN Staff Rules, supra note 67, at 101.6(e); OAS Staff Rules, supra note 11 at 101.7.
71. Budgetary and Financial Rules of the General Secretariat, OEA/SER.P, AG/INF
62/76 (Original: English). This instrument was prepared by the Secretariat in accordance
with Article 95 of the General Standards, presented to the General Assembly for its ac-
knowledgment, and finally issued by way of Executive Order.
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5. General Assembly and Permanent Council Resolutions
The General Assembly's resolutions, as well as those of the
Permanent Council, are also a part of the internal law of the
Organization.
At times, the resolutions of the General Assembly and the
Permanent Council result in novel cases before the Administrative
Tribunal, impacting on the international career servants of the
General Secretariat. Often, two organs square off against each
other in such cases. Thus, in the pending case of Ryan v. Retire-
ment and Pension Committee of the OAS, 72 a staff member has
sued to obtain the minimum pension based on the UN formula,
which the General Assembly and Permanent Council effectively as-
sured by adopting resolutions establishing parity of remuneration,
cost of living, and fringe benefits with the General Secretariat of
the United Nations.
Practical difficulty has arisen, however, because the political-
legislative organs have not approved budget allocations sufficient
to put all of the components of parity into effect. Consequently,
the Secretariat and the Retirement and Pension Committee have
found themselves in the anomalous position of having to imple-
ment a general standard, now part of the internal law of the OAS,
without the necessary funds to execute the standard.
Since the OAS Tribunal's Statute does not contemplate suits
against either the General Assembly or the Permanent Council,
but only against the Secretary General or the Retirement and Pen-
sion Committee, an unusual legal situation occurs. The Retirement
Committee can be sued to enforce a rule created by the political-
legislative organs which have failed to approve the implementing
legislation essential for its execution. Should the Tribunal hold in
favor of the plaintiff, the staff member will have accomplished in-
directly what she could not have achieved directly, that is, ob-
taining a judicial order obliging the member governments to assure
that she and participants in the Fund receive the minimum pen-
sions based on the principle of parity with the UN Retirement
Plan, regardless of the Fund's ability to provide such pensions on
an actuarially sound basis. Thus, by extension, the member gov-
ernments are obliged to make contributions sufficient to assure
compliance with the Tribunal's judgment.
72. Case No. 57.
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It does not take much imagination to see the potential crisis
that could be precipitated by such a ruling, given the considerable
amounts of money involved. Thus, the Effects of Awards's opinion
continues to serve, potentially, in this and other cases as an impor-
tant precedent in modern international organization administra-
tive law.
6. Retirement and Pension Plans
The principle sources of written internal law of international
organizations are contained in the organizations' retirement and
pension plans. The plans prescribe the membership of the commit-
tee of trustees, their duties, and the rights and obligations of both
the employer and the participants in the different funds."'
C. Contracts
While the case law of the different administrative tribunals
constantly refers to "contracts", "employment contracts", and
"contractual rights", the UN family of international organizations
and the OAS General Secretariat rarely use the word "contract" in
the common bilateral sense in the organizations' internal law.
The term "appointment" commonly describes how one even-
tually becomes an international career servant. The offer of ap-
pointment (to the OAS) details such particulars as duty station,
type and duration of appointment, title of post, grade, salary,
fringe benefits, and starting date.
The potential career servant must pass a medical exam, ad-
here to Staff Rules, and sign both a statement by which he accepts
OAS terms and conditions, and a Loyalty Oath containing the ide-
als of the Secretariat's internal labor laws.
A newly-hired international career officer serves a probation-
ary period during which both the quality of his work, and his gen-
73. Supra note 48.
74. Retirement and Pension Plan for the Members of the Staff of the Pan American
Union, April 2, 1959. In the case of the OAS Retirement and Pension Plan, there is a man-
ual called The Policies and Procedures bf the Retirement and Pension Plan which expands
upon the provisions of the Plan itself. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF THE PAN AMERICAN
UNION RETIREMENT AND PENSION PLAN, August 1960.
The incorporation by reference of the Staff Rules into the employment contract has
been the subject of considerable litigation in the area of acquired rights. This is a result of
the unilateral amendment of the Staff Rules without the staff members' consent. Such con-
sent may alter a fundamental condition of employment.
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eral suitability to the international career service is judged. Suc-
cessful completion of the probationary period automatically
entitles the international career servant to the full spectrum of
rights enjoyed by members of the career service.
There are three types of OAS appointments: permanent, fixed
term and temporary. Permanent appointees accomplish the Secre-
tariat's permanent functions. A fixed term appointee serves from
one to five years and theoretically, carries out long-term, non-per-
manent functions. Finally, temporary employees whose contracts
range from a month to less than a year, perform short-term
duties."5
The Office of Personnel's Classification and Salary Adminis-
tration Unit assigns the international servant a salary grade and
increments based on the servant's duties. The Staff Rules prescribe
periodic desk audits by this Unit as well. The audits assure uni-
formity of grade assignments as set forth in the Provisional Job
Classification Standards, and verify the post description in light of
duties actually performed.
1. International and Municipal Law and General Principles
M. B. Akehurst, in The Law Governing Employment in Inter-
national Organizations, states that "if the case law of interna-
tional administrative tribunals is any guide, the relevance of tradi-
tional international law in this field is startlingly limited.
' 76
Akehurst further contends that
municipal law is not, strictly speaking a source of law governing
employment in international organizations in the same way that
Staff Regulations, for instance, are a source of law. It is a sepa-
rate legal system .... It is not even permissible to fall back on
municipal law in the event of lacunae in the Staff Regulations
and Rules; gaps must be filled by reference to general principles
of law and not by any resort to a particular municipal system.7
Although international administrative tribunals are not obliged to
follow international and municipal law, they do have relevance to
the law of international organizations. For example, if a staff mem-
ber participates in his country's social security system and a provi-
75. These distinctions exist in most international organizations. The OAS Tribunal
continues to debate the definition of a "permanent" function.
76. AKEHURST, supra note 17, at 98.
77. Id. at 102.
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sion regarding that participation is written into the internal law of
the international organization, then the particulars of the munici-
pal legal system in question are incorporated into the organiza-
tion's internal law. Nevertheless, the OAS Administrative Tribunal
has rejected the arguments of parties that have urged that the con-
stitutional guarantees provided in their respective municipal sys-
tems should apply to them.
In Hebblethwaite v. Secretary General of the OAS, the Court
held that:
The complaints' statement that the rights and guarantees
afforded them by the Constitution of the United States are and
must be relevant and binding in cases before this Tribunal, and
that such constitutional protection is in fact one of their rights,
must be held invalid in light of Article II of the Tribunal which
states that the Tribunal: ". . shall be competent to hear those
cases in which members of the staff of the General Secretariat of
the Organization of American States allege non-observance of
the conditions established in their respective appointments or
contracts, or violation of other applicable provisions, including
those concerning the Retirement and Pension Plan of the Gen-
eral Secretariat."
Hence, the Tribunal is not competent to hear alleged viola-
tions of the laws of the member states.71
Although the international organizations' administrative tribunals
are not bound to interpret and apply international and municipal
law, a party litigant may argue international or municipal law by
analogy. In Hebblethwaite, counsel for the Secretary General cited
a Mexican case in which the Veracruz State Legislature enacted a
law, mandating that by a fixed date, the state civil service had to
employ a fixed percentage of Mexican nationals2 9 In order to im-
plement this decision, the jobs of several foreign nationals who
were employed by the Veracruz State Government, were termi-
nated contrary to rights embodied in their employement contracts.
The Mexican court held that, notwithstanding the State's unilat-
eral and retroactive deprivation of these workers' contractual
78. Hebblethwaite v. Secretary General, OEA/SER.R. TRIBAD/95 (Judgment No. 30,
June 1, 1977) (Original: Spanish). The tribunals apply general principles of contract and
treaty law, such as pacta sunt aervanda. The concept of force-majeure has also been liti-
gated before the OAS Tribunal. Hernandez de Aguerro v. Secretary General, OEA/SER.R.
TRIBAD/76 (Judgment No. 24, Nov. 16, 1976) (Original: Spanish).
79. Sala del Trabajo de la Suprema Corte de Juaticia de Mexico, cited by M. DE LA
CuEvA, I DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO 406.
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rights, the Legislature possessed a superior right to enact laws for
the common good of the State and its citizenry. The court con-
cluded that the rights violated were merely "expectations".
Although the Administrative Tribunal rejected this case on
the grounds that international career servants, in contrast to na-
tional public servants, required a greater degree of protection, the
Tribunal did recognize that such a national precedent was rele-
vant, at least by analogy,
Thus, it seems fair to conclude that although international ad-
ministrative tribunals need not apply international and municipal
law, courts will nevertheless avail themselves of the wisdom of dif-
ferent legal systems, and adopt the principles that they consider to
be appropriate and useful.
2. Legal Opinions of General Counsel
Legal departments of various international organizations play
a multi-faceted role in interpreting and applying the organizations'
internal law. Typically, the Secretariat for Legal Affairs of the
General Secretariat (Legal Secretariat) of the OAS is called upon
to render opinions involving staff members' rights and duties.
Although Legal Secretariat's opinions are theoretically advi-
sory since the Administration is not bound to accept the analyses
and recommendations rendered, the fact is that the Administration
often follows the opinions. Therefore, the Legal Secretariat's opin-
ions are treated like law and may even have precedential or bind-
ing effect. For instance, before the Ryan case was even brought up
for the preliminary grievance procedures known as Audiencia and
Reconsideration, the Legal Secretariat already had recognized the
merit of the plaintiff's claim.80
Due to the role of the Legal Secretariat as an interpreter of
the written rules which govern personnel matters within the Secre-
tariat, it routinely participates in the development of internal law
and practice. Therefore, the Secretariat's opinions are a minor
source of law within the General Secretariat.
The quasi-judicial function of the general counsel of an inter-
80. Opinion of the Department of Legal Affairs of the OAS, Nov. 16, 1977. The Depart-
ment is now a Secretariat.
Later the Legal Secretariat, as counsel for the Retirement and Pension Committee in
cases before the OAS Tribunal, was in the anomalous position of having to defend a matter
in which its advice had been rejected.
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national organization is merely one of its roles. At times, the Legal
Secretariat must give an opinion on behalf of either the Retire-
ment and Pension Committee or the Secretary General, in cases in
which the two groups' interests may be contrary. Furthermore, in
the Legal Secretariat's role as an advocate, it helps forge new case
law as articulated by the Tribunal.
5. The Jurisprudence of Other International Administrative
Tribunals
In general, international organizations' administrative tribu-
nals freely use holdings established by their peers from other inter-
national organizations. Although these decisions are not legally
binding, the OAS Tribunal nonetheless views judgments of its sis-
ter tribunals as important and respected sources of law.
In Chretien v. Secretary Generals ' as well as Hebblethwaite,
the OAS Tribunal adopted the ILO Tribunal's concept of acquired
rights and the incidental protection of those rights. Although the
OAS cases were not exactly on point factually with the ILO Tribu-
nal case In re Lindsey, the issues presented in the two cases were
identical.82 The OAS Tribunal stated:
On the basis of the principle set by the Tribunal of the In-
ternational Labour Organization, which is one of the most im-
portant sources of legal doctrine on the question of the labor
relations of the staff of international organizations, . . . it must
be held that the administrative decision to terminate the com-
plainants' employment injured them by violating the principle
of non-retroactivity .... as
Finally, the Tribunal is bound by its jurisprudence and to date
has been consistent in its interpretations. Nevertheless, this re-
quirement of consistency is not absolute, and because the Tribunal
is a court of last resort, it is reasonable to assume that at some
time it may reverse itself.
D. Origins of the Administrative Tribunal of the OAS
Prior to the creation of the OAS Tribunal, the grievance pro-
81. Chretien v. Secretary General, OEA/SER.R. TRIBAD/93 (Judgment No. 29, June 1,
1977) (Original: Spanish).
82. In re Lindsey, (Judgment No. 61, Sept. 4, 1962) (Original: French).
83. Hebblethwaite, supra note 78, at 21.
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cedure provided for a staff member's direct appeal to, and a per-
sonal interview with the Secretary General if the member alleged
that the Secretariat had failed to observe the Staff Rules of the
PAU. In addition, the staff member also had a right to appeal first
to a Grievance Committee and subsequently to an Advisory Com-
mittee on Reconsideration. These committees which consisted of
Staff and Administration representatives, both had merely advi-
sory functions.8 4
A report submitted by John P. Hoover of the Special Assign-
ments Unit of the Pan American Union (PAU) in June of 1969,
pointed out that "[a]s the Staff has grown in size, the established
appeals procedure which rests exclusively on the benevolence of
the executive authority, has tended to break down and become in-
operative". s Hoover further noted that then current procedures
"offer[ed] to the staff either a marginal and haphazard protection,
or none at all." ' Mr. Hoover also expressed the need for staff
members to have the right to appeal to an external judicial body.
He stated:
It is by now generally accepted that the Staff of an interna-
tional organization must be insulated against influences and
pressures which may be exerted by one or more individual states
and protected against the exercise of arbitrary administrative
power by the top executive authority of the organization.87
He added:
It is generally held that only if these safeguards are effective
will the international staff feel sufficiently secure to be able to
render the kind and quality of service which the member gov-
ernments expect and in which they can have confidence. A more
pragmatic basis (sic) is that an international organization needs
the best staff it can get and, in order to get it, must be able to
offer prospective employees some assurance of security compara-
ble to that enjoyed by national civil servants and employees of
84. Pan American Staff Regulations, OEA/SER.D/l/1 (English Rev.) (Original: Spanish
at 56-61); Pan American Union Staff Rules, put into force Exec. Order 69-8, 1969, at 10.
85. J. Hoover, Memorandum on Recommendations Regarding PAU Appeals Procedure
2 (Oct. 9, 1969, Dept. of Legal Affairs Archives).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 3. A group of experts in Public Administration and Finance that had studied
the procedures referred to by Hoover, characterized them as "cumbersome," advising sim-
plification. Report of Groups of Experts in Public Administration and Finance, OEA/
SER.G.IV., c-d-1614 (English) (Original: Spanish/English, at 51).
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other international organizations, etc."
In 1968, Elba Kybal, Chairman of the PAU Staff Committee,
proposed the creation of an administrative tribunal to Galo Plaza,
who was Secretary General at that time. Mrs. Kybal alternatively
proposed that the PAU adhere to the Statute of an already-ex-
isting tribunal such as the UN or the ILO.'1 However, article 14 of
the UN Tribunal Statute precluded such adhesion by international
organizations that did not belong to the UN family."0
The initial study conducted on the subject on behalf of Secre-
tary General Plaza, by the Special Assistant to the Under Secre-
tary for Economic and Social Affairs, Georges D. Landau, strongly
supported the creation of a new OAS administrative tribunal. 1
With the encouragement of both the Secretary General and the
Staff Committee, work began on the preparation of a proposal for
consideration by the General Assembly. This work was especially
timely because, as Mr. Landau pointed out, new staff rules were
being prepared, the Group of Experts' report had favored the crea-
tion of such a mechanism, and both the Chairman and Secretary of
the Council were former judges on the UN Administrative
Tribunal.92
As a starting point, Mr. Landau suggested Wilfred Jenk's defi-
nition of "international administrative tribunals" as organs estab-
lished by the decision-making bodies of international organizations
for the purpose of granting redress "for specific grievances arising
from the violation of legal rights or equitable expectations which
are in the nature of legal rights."' Actual responsibility for prepar-
ing the proposal and draft statute for consideration by the General
Assembly and Permanent Council respectively was entrusted to
the Department of Legal Affairs of the General Secretariat.
Leon K. Smith, Senior Legal Officer of the Department, col-
laborated with F.V. Garcia-Amador, the Department Director, in
conducting the initial comparative studies of the statutes of the
other international tribunals. Mr. Smith noted that "the tribunal's
88. Hoover, supra note 85, at 3.
89. See handwritten memorandum from George D. Landau to Francisco Garcia-
Amador of Nov. 12, 1968 (Archives of Secretariat for Legal Affairs).
90. Statute of U.N. Administrative Tribunal, supra note 34, at art. 14.
91. G. Landau, Preliminary Report on the Establishment of an Administrative Tribu-
nal of the OAS (Nov. 1968, Archives of Secretariat for Legal Affairs).
92. Id. at 7.
93. C.W. JENKS, THE PROPER LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 115, 116 (1962).
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effectiveness should be determined primarily by the wrongs that
were not done and the disputes that were not allowed to fester
simply because the Court existed, and only secondarily by its judi-
cial statistics." 94
In conjunction with this effort, a Working Group of the Gen-
eral Committee of the Permanent Council received the task of
adapting the Provisional General Standards of the Secretariat to
the new structure of the OAS. This new structure was the result of
the Protocol of Buenos Aires then about to enter into force, which
would amend the Charter of the Organization."5 The Working
Group was chaired by Ambassador Alejandro Magnet of Chile."
Upon the Chilean delegation's withdrawal from the Working
Group, Panamanian Ambassador Nander A. Pitty Velasquez was
elected to carry on Ambassador Magnet's duties as Chairman.
In 1971, the Permanent Council's Committee on Legal and Po-
litical Affairs named a second Working Group to consider the Gen-
eral Secretariat's draft Statute of the Administrative Tribunal."
Ambassadors Raul A. Quijano of Argentina, and Carlos Casap of
Bolivia, were named Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively.'8
Using the draft Statute prepared by the Department of Legal Af-
fairs, and the Statutes of the Tribunals of both the UN and the
ILO as models, the Second Group prepared a new draft Statute."
The Permanent Council's action through this Working Group
complied with Resolution 35 of the General Assembly, passed on
April 22, 1971. It provided for the creation of the Administrative
Tribunal. Thus, the legal birth of this judicial body actually pre-
ceded its Statute, Rules of Procedure, and physical constitution.'"
In order to bring the General Assembly's other basic regula-
94. L. Smith, Handwritten Note in Comparative Studies of International Tribunals
(Nov. 1971) (Archives of Secretariat for Legal Affairs).
95. Protocol of Buenos Aires, supra note 3.
96. The Working Group was made up of representatives of Argentina, Chile, Ecuador,
Panama, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay.
97. This Group consisted of representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uru-
guay, and Venezuela.
98. Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de la Comisibn de Asuntos Juridicos y Politicos
sobre el Proyecto de Estatuto del Tribunal Admrinistrativo de la OEA, OEA/SER.G., CP/
CAJP - 171, Rev. 1 (June 14, 1971) (Original: Spanish).
99. The Working Group acceded to the Staff Committee's request to present its obser-
vations on the proposed draft.
100. In conformity with Resolution 35 of the General Assembly, the Permanent Council
formally adopted the statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the OAS on July 16, 1971.
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tions in line with those of the newly-created Tribunal, the Assem-
bly established the General Standards, including Article 60 which
states:
When the procedures set forth in these Standards (regard-
ing the Audiencia and Reconsideration) and in the other provi-
sions in force in the General Secretariat (viz. the Staff Rules)
have been exhausted, an interested party who considers himself
injured shall have the right to resort to the Administrative Tri-
bunal of the Organization, in accordance with the Statutes (sic)
of that Tribunal.1"' (Parenthetical remarks are the author's.)
In further compliance with Resolution 35, the Permanent Council
selected six judges for the Tribunal. Their initial terms were estab-
lished by lot and future elections were to be conducted annually.
This method would assure both membership rotation and con-
tinuity. Consequently, although a judge is normally chosen for a
single six-year term, the original members served terms that varied
from one to six years. The judges, each from a different nation,
were nominated by their respective governments. However, the
judges were elected in their personal capacities, thus assuring the
independence of each member.10
At the installation of the members of the new Tribunal, the
Chairman of the Permanent Council, Ambassador Luis Herrera of
Guatemala, stated that the work of the Tribunal is a
101. General Standards, supra note 9, art. 60. Subsequently the Secretary General es-
tablished Staff Rule 112.5(k). It allows a party that has not received a final decision within
thirty days after the Reconsideration Committee has forwarded its report to the Secretary
General to appeal to the Organization's Administrative Tribunal.
102. The president and vice-president are chosen based on their seniority and hold
their offices for a period of one year. Rules of Procedure of the OAS Administrative Tribu-
nal approved October 24, 1975 during the Eighth Regular Meeting of the Tribunal, at Arti-
cle 2. The first judges were Licenciado Juan Bautista Clement Beltran of Mexico, Professor
Mozart Victor Russamano of Brazil, Dr. Carlos Giambrano of Uruguay, Dr. Carlos Alberto
Pignetti of Argentina, Dr. John Luis Antonio Passalacqua of the United States, and
Licenciado Ronaldo Porta Espaia of Guatemala. At the installation of the members of the
new Tribunal, Secretary General Plaza, paraphrased Leon Smith's words:
It should be observed that the success of the Tribunal shall not be measured
by the number of cases it is called upon to resolve. It is hoped that the existence
of the Tribunal shall stimulate administrative action in the solution of personnel
problems in a manner whereby the interested parties needn't recur to the Tribu-
nal in many cases. Thus by its very presence the Tribunal shall strengthen the
career service of the international civil servant.
Informe del Consejo Permanente a la Asamblea General sobre el Complimiento de la Reso-
lution AG/RES. (i-0/71) "Tribunal Administrativo", OEA/SER.G, CP/DOC. 166/72 Rev. 1.
Anexo III (February 28, 1972) at 93 (Original: Spanish).
1982]
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
mission which we understand shall be hard, difficult and com-
plex. But we are sure - given the background of the judges of
this Administrative Tribunal, whom we in Permanent Council
have responsibly designated, given their status as American uni-
versity professors, teachers of international labor law - we are
confident that they will . . . ably carry out the task we've as-
signed to them. . .. '03
E. The Jurisprudence of the OAS Tribunal
The OAS Tribunal had rendered a total of fifty-nine judg-
ments as of its Spring 1981 session. The Secretary General has
been the defendant in fifty of these suits. The Retirement and
Pension Committee has been sued before the Tribunal twelve
times, often concurrently with the Secretary General. In addition,
the Director General of the Inter-American Institute for Agricul-
tural Sciences (IICA) twice has been a defendant.104
The chart which follows contains a detailed breakdown of the
cases which thus far have been decided by the OAS Tribunal. The
Secretary General has won twenty-three and lost twenty-five. The
Retirement and Pension Committee has won four cases and lost
seven. The results in maniy of the cases have been mixed. These
partial victories are often of great importance because they clarify,
and frequently strengthen certain administrative powers of the
particular defendant.
At times, the Tribunal has decided against one or more of the
plaintiffs in a suit involving multiple complainants. For instance,
in Garcia et al. v. the Secretary General, only one of the five
plaintiffs prevailed even though all complainants raised the same
issues.105 Four of the claims were dismissed because the Tribunal
viewed the factual circumstances differently. Other results were so
mixed that a student of the Tribunal could not discern which
party was the victor and which the loser. The two actions brought
against the Director General of IICA illustrate this confusion. Al-
though the complainants won on minor issues, the Tribunal re-
jected their principal claims.'06
103. Id., Anexo IV.
104. At the time of this writing, thirteen cases are pending before the Administrative
Tribunal of the OAS.
105. Garcia v. Secretary General, OEA/SER.R., TRIBAD/19 (Judgment No. 6, May 29,
1974) (Original: Spanish).
106. Frias Moran v. Director General of IICA, OEA/SER.R., TRIBAD/102 (Judgment
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The value of the Tribunal's work cannot be gauged in simplis-
tic terms of who prevailed in the various cases. The importance of
the Tribunal's work can be properly discerned only in a study of
its jurisprudence. Nevertheless, a list of the parties and the out-
come of the various cases indicates the court's behavior, and may
be useful.
The Chart on the following pages also indicates the types of
remedies applied and the attorneys' fees ordered by the Tribunal.
The money damages awarded, often in terms of months of salary
or accumulated fringe benefits, have been substantial.
The Tribunal frequently has proposed remedies in the alterna-
tive, giving the defendant the option of either reinstating a termi-
nated staff member or indemnifying him at a fixed amount. Thus,
the financial significance of the Tribunal's judgments is an impor-
tant factor for all of the parties.""7
F. Recommendations
Notwithstanding the indisputable accomplishments of the Tri-
bunal, there are a number of matters which still must be addressed
by the court, the administrators of the Secretariat, and the OAS
member governments. What follows is a series of recommendations
regarding steps that might be taken by the different participants
to improve the functioning of the Tribunal.
1. The Tribunal
a. Rules of Procedure regarding testimony, and examination
of plaintiff and defendant should be improved by the
Tribunal.
The Tribunal currently permits a staff member either to re-
present himself pro se, or to designate a legal representative who
need not be a lawyer.'08
No. 31, Nov. 11, 1977) (Original: Spanish); Ogle v. Director General of IICA, OEA/SER.R.,
TRIBAD/106 (Judgment No. 34, Apr. 28, 1978) (Original: Spanish).
107. To complete the overview, it should be noted that in three of the fifty-nine cases,
third party intervenors have interposed themselves in accordance with Chapter IV, Article
24 of the Rules of Procedure. In each instance, however, their claims were rejected by the
court. Holzman v. the Secretary General, OEAISER. R., TRIBAD/65 (Judgment No. 20,
May 28, 1978) (Original: Spanish); Bauta v. the Secretary General, OEA/SER. R., TRIBAD/
77 (Judgment No. 25, Nov. 16, 1977) (Original: Spanish).
108. Rules of Procedure of the OAS Administrative Tribunal, ch. III, art. 22. Approved
Oct. 24, 1975 at the Eighth Regular Meeting of the Tribunal.
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In both situations, the Tribunal does not allow the plaintiff to tes-
tify, or to be subjected to either direct or cross-examination. This
practice is irregular and violates the rights of both the plaintiff and
the defendant. In the former case, it prevents the staff member
from stating, in his own words, the bases of his complaint. Even in
instances in which the plaintiff testifies de facto in the course of
his final argument, neither the court nor the defense has an oppor-
tunity to question him. This violates the right of the accused to
confront his accuser.10 9
The Tribunal has held that the Secretary General may not be
ordered to appear in person before the Tribunal."' All other staff
members, however, are subject to the Tribunal's order to appear
and testify as witnesses. In fact, in at least one instance, the tribu-
nal ordered the appearance and testimony of the Assistant Secre-
tary General."" Even though the Tribunal believes that the plain-
tiff should not be cross-examined by the Secretary General's
Counsel, the plaintiff at least should be examined carefully by the
judges.
b. Opening statements by the parties should be allowed by
the Tribunal.
The Tribunal's Rules of Procedure do not permit opening
statements. Thus, the first portion of oral hearings consists of ex-
amination of all witnesses except the plaintiff and the Secretary
General. The closing statements of the parties' counsel and a brief
opportunity for rebuttal follow the witness examinations. The clos-
ing statements of counsel or other parties unaccustomed to public
speaking and legal debates often become rambling expositions.
A better method of establishing the focal point of the parties'
respective arguments would be to permit brief opening statements
containing both the allegations and the theories of the case as per-
ceived from the opposing vantage points.1 2
109. U.S. CONST. art. VI; State v. Crooker, 123 Me. 310, 122 A. 865 (1923).
110. Bauta v. Secretary General, OEA/SER. R., TRIBAD/77 (Judgment No. 25, Nov.
16, 1977) (Original: Spanish).
111. Id. The Tribunal would be well advised to state its position in less categorical
terms, on the appearance of the Secretary General before the Tribunal. It is easy to envision
a case in which the ends of justice might be defeated without the Secretary General's
testimony.
112. In defense of this recommendation, it should be noted that opening statements are
a routine and useful aspect of common law trial procedure, and the parties may use, waive,
or reserve such statements.
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ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
At common law, the jury either knows nothing of the case at
bar at its outset or, at least, has an unbiased view of the merits of
the case. The Tribunal members, on the other hand, presumably
have read the written pleadings prior to the hearing.
Therefore, although opening statements are not very crucial in
the Tribunal's oral proceedings, they may be very helpful both in
focusing on and defining the issues, and in presenting the evidence.
This is especially important in terms of marshalling proofs and tes-
timony since, occasionally, it has been unclear what a particular
party was attempting to accomplish in his examination of
witnesses."'
Permission to make opening statements during the court's oral
hearings require amending the Rules of Procedure. The Tribunal
itself has the authority to change its own procedures.
c. Rules of discovery of evidence should be better defined
by the Tribunal.
The Secretariat for Legal Affairs recommended the policy im-
plemented by the Office of Human Resources of allowing a staff
member to view his own personal file. This includes viewing the
"confidential file" which can only be viewed by the staff member in
the presence of a custodian from the Office of Human Resources.
Nothing may be removed or photocopied. However, the employee
may make handwritten notes.
The staff member is somewhat hindered in obtaining from his
own files authentic copies of documentary evidence that may be
pertinent to his case. However, the staff member can overcome this
impediment. He may insist that the Reconsideration Committee
and the Tribunal, which both have a general subpoena power over
files, take note of the documents that the member deems relevant
to his case.
Staff access to files is more difficult for an employee who seeks
to learn the contents of another staff member's file. This occurs
when an employee vying for a vacant post asserts that he is more
qualified than his competitor.
This delicate situation can arise if a staff member's files con-
tain sensitive material relating to his personal life, including the
113. Witnesses should be sequestered during opening statements. This practice is al-
ready followed by the Tribunal during the examination of witnesses.
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individual's mental or physical health, or family status. Thus, the
Secretariat must respect the privacy of its staff members. Although
this handicap may also be overcome by the Reconsideration Com-
mittee and Tribunal's general subpoena powers, it is doubtful
whether the Tribunal is either disposed or equipped to act as an
investigator.
The Office of Human Resources should not have the task of
censorship for two reasons: first, because it is identified with the
Secretariat; and second, because it has neither the expertise nor
the personnel to dedicate to the problem.
In the absence of a discovery mechanism, the employee may
become frustrated in his efforts to redress his grievances. Further-
more, the lack of this fundamental process may suggest an Admin-
istration cover-up.
d. Rules regarding the submission of evidence should be
clarified and improved by the Tribunal.
Generally, evidence presented to the Tribunal is either docu-
mentary or oral. The Rules of Procedure require that authentic or
"true copies" of written evidence be physically attached to the
pleadings filed in each case."' At times, the exchange of pleadings
can be completed up to six months before a case is decided. How-
ever, one of the parties often will receive written evidence of which
it had been unaware.
Such evidence is admissible by implication. The Rules of Pro-
cedure allow for revision when new evidence is produced even after
a case has been decided. Thus, it is reasonable to presume that a
similar allowance may be made before judgment is rendered.
On several occasions, both the claimants and the Secretary
General have sought to introduce documentary evidence just prior
to or during oral proceedings. 15 However, these requests have been
uniformly rejected. These denials are wise in light of the court's
failure to determine whether such evidence was reasonably availa-
ble beforehand.
The new procedure advanced in this article would give the op-
posing party the opportunity to evaluate the new proof. Although
this system may delay the proceedings, it is in the best interests of
114. Rules of Procedure, supra note 108, ch. III, art. 9(e).
115. See, e.g., Hernandez de Aguerro, supra note 78.
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justice for a party to be aware of all evidence being introduced
against him.
The matter of testimonial evidence also deserves some re-ex-
amination by the Tribunal. Testimony is given under oath by both
expert and res gestae witnesses. Generally, the Tribunal President
consistently has sustained objections to hearsay testimony. Never-
theless, the tendency to ask leading questions on direct examina-
tion often materially affects the testimony of some witnesses.
2. The General Secretariat
a. The Secretariat should minimize the use of memoranda,
circulars, and orders emitted by its dependencies.
Executive orders, administrative memoranda, and personnel
and management circulars made it difficult for the Secretariat for
Legal Affairs to keep abreast of the Administration's numerous or-
ders. It would be adviseable to channel these written matters
through a single officer in order to harmonize them in terms of
style and content, and to reduce the confusion that currently exists
because of this abundance of paper.
b. The Secretary General should try to clarify the attor-
ney-client privilege.
Currently, the Secretariat for Legal Affairs frequently must
advise the Administration regarding the rights and duties of staff
members. The memoranda issued by the Secretariat routinely are
placed in staff members' personal files. Thus, when a labor contro-
versy arises, the attorney-client relationship between house counsel
and the Administration has already been breached. Discussion
must be held with the Director of Human Resources in order to
resolve this problem.
Another dimension of this problem occurs in proceedings
before the Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal may violate the
attorney-client privilege in the Secretariat by use of its subpoena
authority. The Administration, in consultation with the Legal Sec-
retariat, must try to clarify this ancient and important privilege.
c. The holdings of the Tribunal should be disseminated
more widely within the Secretariat.
The Tribunal's rulings that certain administrative practices
1982]
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are proper or improper, alerts the Secretariat to what is permissi-
ble. However, mistakes already addressed by the Tribunal often
have been repeated.
To resolve this problem, the Secretariat for Legal Affairs
should prepare digests of the cases decided by the Tribunal. These
digests then should be circulated to the Secretariat's supervisory
personnel.
3. The Member-States
a. The member states promptly should approve a new Re-
tirement and Pension Plan for the staff.
The current Plan is outdated. It is philosophically out of step
with modern social security systems. Few staff members actually
receive pensions. Upon retirement, most members opt for a lump
sum liquidation of their accounts.
Moreover, the Retirement and Pension Committee's present
authority to extend a staff member's period of service when the
member has reached mandatory retirement age clearly is an execu-
tive function that should belong only to the Secretary General.
Instituting a new Retirement and Pension Plan may be diffi-
cult because participants in the current Plan enjoy many rights ac-
quired under it. Nevertheless, it is not impossible to preserve these
rights while implementing a modern and fair retirement and pen-
sion system.
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